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1 Introduction
Fund fees are one of the most important criteria for choosing a fund (Sirri and Tufano,
1998; West and Leonard-Chambers, 2006). Barber et al. (2005) find that investors
increasingly take fees into account. Given the role of fees, it is important to understand
why investors choose certain fee structures. This choice is a non-trivial task as various
fee structures exist that can influence fund performance differently. One important
distinction is the difference between a management fee and a performance fee. While
a management fee is typically a percentage of the funds assets under management, a
performance fee is typically a percentage of the funds gains. Performance fees can
be both asymmetric (meaning that the investment company only collects part of the
gains) and symmetric (meaning that the investment company also refunds part of the
losses). Both U.S. and European hedge funds typically use asymmetric performance fees.
Fee structures for mutual funds however are not identical in the U.S. and in Europe.
Mutual funds with asymmetric performance fees are common in Europe. In Germany
for example, more than one third of the assets under management in open-end funds are
in funds with asymmetric performance fees.1 In the U.S., only symmetric performance
fees are allowed for mutual funds. Golec and Starks (2004) mention that more and more
mutual funds use these symmetric performance fees. U.S. hedge funds however widely
use asymmetric performance fees. Performance fees in general are widely used; we focus
on asymmetric ones. This paper shows which factors contribute to the choice of a fund
with a performance fee. We document that loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979,
1984) is a main driver for this choice.
Various possible reasons for the preference for a performance fee fund exist. One rea-
1Own calculation based on Morningstar direct. Starting in July 2013, performance fees of new funds
in Germany are regulated to a stronger extent. Only two forms are allowed: either a fee with a
benchmark index or a high-water mark construction. The fee we use in our study is comparable to
a high-water mark construction in the first year as it is paid on all positive returns in the first year
of a fund's existence.
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son is the expectation of a higher performance. Agency theory posits that a principal
(such as a mutual fund investor) should incentivize an agent (such as the investment
company) to achieve a higher performance with payments linked to the agent's perfor-
mance (e.g. Berhold, 1971; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Elton et al., 2003). Agency theory
also provides a reason against performance fees; performance fees may induce extensive
risk taking. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Carpenter (2000) show that asymmetric
performance fees lead to extensive risk taking. Starks (1987) models symmetric and
asymmetric performance fees. She finds that a manager with symmetric performance
fees will chose the optimal risk from the investor's perspective while a manager with
asymmetric fees will tend to excessive risk taking. Das and Sundaram (2002) find the
exact opposite. They compare symmetric and asymmetric performance fees and show
that asymmetric fees are better for investors. Li and Tiwari (2009) partly confirm this
finding. In their model, asymmetric fees are better suited to incentivize managers if
the fee depends on a benchmark and if this benchmark closely tracks the manager's
investment style. From the theoretical perspective, the incentivization resulting from
both symmetric and asymmetric performance fees can lead to better performance and
to extensive risk-taking.
The empirical literature has confirmed some of these theoretical findings. Fees have
an important influence on fund performance; Carhart (1997) shows that fees have a
negative impact on performance. Fees in general can lead to manager incentives that
are not aligned with the investors' ones: Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Brown et al.
(1996) show that funds increase their volatility in order to benefit from fees. This also
implies that the fund managers' behavior depends on the compensation scheme of the
fund itself; investors can expect the funds compensation scheme to affect the choice of
assets and thus also the performance of the fund. Massa and Patgiri (2009) show that
performance fees can lead to a positive alpha but at the cost of a higher volatility and a
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lower probability for the fund to survive. Golec and Starks (2004) use the prohibition of
asymmetric performance fees in the U.S. to analyze the impact of these fees. They find
that the prohibition made funds increase their risk to a lesser extent than comparable
funds. This implies that asymmetric fees can lead to an increase in risk. Evidence for
symmetric performance fees goes in the opposite direction. Elton et al. (2003) analyze
U.S. mutual funds with symmetric performance fees. These funds appear to generate an
alpha due to stock picking ability and due to lower costs. Empirically, funds with sym-
metric performance fees appear to be more beneficial for investors. From these previous
findings, we derive our first hypotheses. As the incentivization from performance fees
can lead to both positive and negative consequences, the average investor could perceive
incentivization effects to be neutral.
• Investors who perceive a better performance to be the dominating effect of a per-
formance fee prefer performance fee funds.
• Investors who perceive an increase in risk to be the dominating effect of a perfor-
mance fee prefer funds with a pure management fee.
Apart from these rational preferences for or against a performance fee, non-rational
reasons could exist. Such a reason is fairness. Baker et al. (1988) hypothesize that
fairness is an aspect that complements incentives. Carroll (1989) considers fairness as
an important aspect of performance fees; he argues that fairness should be a part of
the compensation scheme such that managers benefit from a good performance. An-
other possible reason for a performance fee may be the loss aversion of an investor. A
performance fee is paid in case of positive returns; in turn the fee in case of negative
returns is lower. Consequently a performance fee allows an investor to reduce a loss
by reducing his gains. As losses are more heavily weighted than gains of the same size
(cf. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), a loss-averse investor
should prefer a performance fee over a management fee. The investor can transfer a fee
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from a negative state (where it hurts him more to pay it) to a positive state (where it
hurts him less). A similar argument has been investigated by Zamir and Ritov (2010)
for the choice of attorneys' fees: Clients who chose a fee that depends on the outcome
of the trial (comparable to a performance fee for a fund) are ready to accept a fee with
twice to three times the expected amount of a fee that does not depend on the outcome
of the trial (comparable to a management fee). Attorneys' clients prefer to give up a
larger part of a good outcome if their payment is reduced for bad outcomes. Fairness
and loss aversion complete our hypotheses.
• Investors, who feel treated unfairly if they pay a fee in case of negative returns,
prefer a pure management fee.
• Investors, who want the fund (manager) to be treated fairly, prefer a performance
fee as the fund (manager) benefits more from good outcomes.
• Investors with a higher loss aversion prefer performance fee funds as these allow
them to smooth their gains and losses.
We analyze investors' fee preferences with two survey studies. The first one was filled
in by 325 participants recruited from the German general population. First, subjects
choose between two different hypothetical funds. These are identical except for their
fee structures. One fund has a pure management fee (that is calculated as a percentage
of the fund's asset at the end of each year) while the other fund has an asymmetric
performance fee (that is calculated as a percentage of the fund's gains if there is a positive
performance). As our paper is -to the best of our knowledge- the first one to investigate
preferences for performance fees, we use a simplified design to gather some insights on
this subjects. A one-year investment horizon and a pure performance fee fund (i.e. a fund
without any fixed fee whatsoever) is used to make the fees easy to calculate and easy to
compare. The one-year horizon avoids effects from previous returns which are common
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in a high-water mark construction. This also allows to circumvent the explanation of
the high-water mark construct which may be too complicated for some subjects. The
fact that no fixed fee is paid for the performance fee fund reduces our subjects decision
to a choice between two simple different fee-types. Both the performance fee fund
and the management fee fund invest in securities listed in the Euro Stoxx 50 and try
to outperform the Euro Stoxx 50. In order to avoid interference on the hypothesized
effects by the past performance of the two funds, they are described as being about
to enter the market and not having a performance history. This is important as past
performance is one of the main drivers of investors' fund choice (Sirri and Tufano, 1998).
The focus on past performance remains when different fees are added to explain fund
choice. Choi et al. (2010) find that fees are not sufficiently taken into account and
that past performance remains the main driver of fund choice. Neither is this focus
on past performance mitigated by mandatory cost information (Pontari et al., 2009)
nor by simplified information in form of summary prospectuses (Beshears et al., 2010;
Kozup et al., 2008). Instead of a performance history of the funds, the history of the
benchmark index is given which can serve as an indication for the funds' performance.
Subjects decide upon the maximum performance fee they are willing to pay as compared
to a management fee of 1.5%. The same subjects are then presented with a second choice
where the maximum performance fee for two different share classes is elicited. The only
difference to the two-fund case is that both share classes have identical returns; the
fee choice does not influence the incentives of the fund (manager). Subjects are told
that both share classes have the same return before fees and that they only differ in
fee structure. The past (average and conditional) returns of the share classes and the
respective probabilities are given. They equal the numbers for the Euro Stoxx 50 from
the decisions for the two different funds. In this case, the rational reasons should not
apply such that the focus is on fairness and loss aversion. After this decision, possible
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reasons and control variables are elicited via text questions.
The second study was filled in by 260 participants from the German general popula-
tion. Subjects were assigned to one of three conditions. In the first condition, they had
to decide upon the maximum performance fee and they were asked text questions after-
wards (similar to the first study). In the second condition, subjects were asked about
possible reasons before they had to decide upon the maximum performance fee. In the
third condition, subjects were asked to choose the maximum management fee they are
willing to pay as opposed to a fixed performance fee. Afterwards they were asked text
questions. The same funds are used in all three conditions. The two funds used are
identical to the two funds used in the first study except for the fact that the Euro Stoxx
50 history has another annual return (due to the timing of the second study).
Due to the simplified design, subjects could calculate which fund is cheaper in terms
of expected fees such that they could always choose the cheaper fund. Subjects in
our sample choose a higher performance fee than such a purely fee minimizing investor
would do (17.4% on average instead of 10% in the first study, 15.5% instead of 10% in the
second study). For both studies, regression analyses indicate that this can be explained
with a belief in higher return or lower risk of the performance fee fund and with loss
aversion of the investors who choose performance fees. This effect is robust to the
inclusion of control variables like gender, age, financial literacy, income, and education.
Furthermore, we find that investors seem to rely mainly on economic factors (return,
risk, personal well-being) instead of soft factors (fairness towards the fund manager).
When text questions are asked first, the average chosen performance fee is reduced to
12.4% which is closer to a purely fee minimizing investor's choice of 10% but still above
it. The factors influencing this decision remain the same. When subjects decide upon
the maximum management fee they are willing to pay, their reasons change with the
different focus. In this case, investors are seeking fairness. A belief in higher returns
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of the performance fee fund and loss aversion remain significant predictors. Subjects
choose a lower management fee if they fear to pay too much in case of losses.
Evidence on fee choice from previous surveys is limited. Most papers focus on fees in
general and do not test different fee structures. Wilcox (2003) uses conjoint analyses to
identify investors preferences. He finds that investors with higher financial knowledge
and higher wealth consider fees to a lesser extent. Capon et al. (1996) analyze decision
criteria with Likert scales. One quarter of their subjects attribute a high importance to
management fees. Müller and Weber (2010) find a positive relation between financial
literacy and a preference for low-cost funds. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is
the first one to directly analyze explanations for different fee structures.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the design of our
studies and the resulting data, section 3 describes our results, and section 4 concludes.
2 Data And Data Collection
Participants for both studies were recruited from a list of previous study participants
who agreed to be contacted again for further studies. The list of previous participants
resulted from the studies of Müller and Weber (2010), Kaufmann et al. (2013) and Ehm
et al. (2013), which used e-mail distribution list and newspaper articles to recruit their
subjects. The study which was closest to our survey was conducted over a year before
our surveys such that effects from the participation in these studies can be excluded.
Half of the e-mail-addresses on the list were randomly selected for an e-mail with a link
to Study I of this paper. The remaining e-mail-addresses were used for Study II. In
the invitational e-mail, potential participants were told that they can participate in a
survey on mutual funds; the focus on fund fees was not explicitly stated. 325 participants
followed the link to the first study and completed it; 260 participants followed the link
to the second study and completed it.
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Study I
Study I consists of three different investment decisions followed by text questions
that serve to explain their choices. The study uses a within-subjects design where all
participants make all three decisions.
• In the first case, they decide upon the maximum performance fee for a fund with
a pure management fee fund as an alternative. Both funds are independent from
each other, thus they can have different subsequent returns.
• In the second case, they decide upon the maximum performance fee for one of two
share classes of the same fund where both classes have the exact same development.
Performance, risk, and fund incentives are the same for both share classes in this
case such that these reasons should not play a role for the decision between the
different fees.
• In the third case, they decide again between two share classes. This case is used for
robustness checks as the share classes have a performance history that is different
from the second case.
The exact decision context is as follows.
After a reception screen, participants are presented with the first of three investment
decisions where they are asked to invest an hypothetical amount of e 10,000 in either
a performance fee fund or in a management fee fund. They are given the following
information on the two funds. Both the management fee fund and the performance fee
fund invest in securities listed in the Euro Stoxx 50 and try to outperform the Euro Stoxx
50. Both are about to enter the market and have no prior performance history. Subjects
cannot rely on past performance of the funds as investors have been shown to do (cf.
e.g. Sirri and Tufano, 1998). This allows to focus on fees as they are not interfering with
past performance as they have been shown to do (cf. Choi et al., 2010). Subjects receive
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information about the Euro Stoxx 50 instead, which can serve as an indication for the
funds' performance and for the funds' fees. Subjects are told the average return of the
Euro Stoxx 50 (8.5% p.a. since introduction), the historical frequencies for positive and
negative returns (70% and 30%), as well as the average positive (22.4%) and negative
return (-23.2%). Along with this information, they are shown a histogram of the annual
Euro Stoxx 50 returns since introduction (see figure 2).
In Study I, the maximum performance fee in all three cases is elicited iteratively. Sub-
jects repeatedly chose between a fixed management fee and a a performance fee. They
have to invest the whole investment amount in one fund (or share-class); a split-up is not
possible. First, they chose between a 1.5% management fee (on the net asset value at
the end of the year) and a 17.5% performance fee (on any positive return). If they prefer
the performance fee (the management fee), they then chose between the same man-
agement fee and a higher (lower) performance fee. With three to four iterations, the
indifference point where a subject switches from the performance fee to the management
fee is elicited. This point shows which maximum performance fee this subject is ready
to pay. The maximum performance fee chosen will be explained with various personal
characteristics in the following sections. The maximum and minimum performance fee
that can be chosen are 30% and 5% respectively. The choice between two funds (Which
fund do you prefer?) as opposed to the direct elicitation of the maximum performance
fee (What is the maximum performance fee you are ready to pay?) has been chosen de-
liberately. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) show that different elicitation methods (choice
vs. matching) can lead to a preference reversal. Neither choice nor matching leads to
generally true preferences (Carmon and Simonson, 1998). Each method leads to prefer-
ences that are true within the respective context. In our context, the elicitation via a
choice between two funds is more natural: an investor is more likely to compare different
funds and to chose one of them (choice) than to determine a certain fee structure and
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search for a fund with the chosen fee structure afterwards (matching).
Insert figure 2 here.
After the elicitation of the maximum performance fee for two different funds, the
maximum performance fee for two different share classes is elicited. The elicitation is
again iterative over the same performance fee range as before. The only difference to the
two-fund case is that both share classes have identical returns; incentives, managerial
risk-taking, and outperformance should be irrelevant in this case. Subjects are told
that both share classes have the same return before fees and that they only differ in
fee structure. The past (average and conditional) returns of the share classes and the
respective probabilities are given. The past performance of the Euro Stoxx 50 is also
used as the underlying distribution for the share classes. Consequently, these numbers
are the same as in the decisions for the two different funds thus making the two cases
comparable. A figure similar to figure 2 is provided. Only the title is different and
reads Past annual returns of the fund. Afterwards, the maximum performance fee for
another share class case with a different distribution of returns is elicited. This third
decision is used for robustness checks.
For both, the decisions between different funds and the decisions between share classes,
subjects were not paid. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) show that incentives are not
important in experiments similar to this one (e.g. trading in markets or choosing between
risky gambles); consequently the lack of payments should not affect the results. The
reason for the lack of a payment is very simple: any possible payment would have been
too low. Incentive compatible payments are normally scaled down: if the hypothetical
decision context involves thousands of dollars/euros, the payment will nevertheless be
below 100 dollars/euros. The part of this down-scaled payment that is due to the fee
structure would have been very low. While fees are really important in real-life decisions
where they can amount to hundreds of dollars/euros, the impact of the fees in this
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experiment would have been on the cent-level. Other solutions lack practicability as
well. A payment based on the chosen fees only would point at the aim of the study. A
higher investment amount would make the impact of the fee structure larger but possible
payments would become too expensive at the same time.
The elicitation of maximum performance fees is followed by questions on possible
reasons for the choice of one fee over the other. The reasons include questions on manager
incentives, outperformance, increased managerial risk taking, loss aversion, and fairness.
The incentivization of a fund manager is seen as an important aspect in the literature (see
e.g. Brown et al., 1996; Massa and Patgiri, 2009); a fund manager that participates in
the fund's success is expected to exert higher effort. This can potentially lead to a better
performance and to a higher risk taking (cf. Massa and Patgiri, 2009). Investors could
also be reluctant to pay a fee when they face a negative return. Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) have shown that losses are more heavily weighted than gains of the same size.
Following this idea, investors could prefer paying a higher fee in case of positive returns
if this allows them to eliminate a fee in case of negative returns. Zamir and Ritov (2010)
find the same pattern for the choice of attorneys' compensation schemes; clients try
to avoid an additional loss when they face a negative outcome, namely losing in court.
Investors may also want the compensation scheme to be fair; on the one hand they might
want the manager to benefit from good decisions and on the other hand they might be
reluctant to pay for bad decisions. These reasons are measured on 7-point Likert scales
with 1 meaning Strongly disagree and 7 meaning Strongly agree. The wording of the
questions can be found in table 1. Afterwards, loss aversion and risk aversion are elicited
with standard lottery questions. For loss aversion, one indifference between a gain and a
loss is needed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Abdellaoui et al., 2008). The loss is fixed
to e 1,000 (with a 50% chance) and the gain that makes subjects indifferent is elicited.
For risk aversion, the certainty equivalent for a lottery with a 50% chance to win e 500
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and a 50% chance to win e 0 is elicited.
Insert table 1 here.
Participants then estimate the level of the Euro Stoxx 50 in one year. This estimate
is used to measure optimism. At the time of the estimation, the Euro Stoxx was at
around 2,800 points. Subjects who are optimistic about the development of the market
should tend to prefer a lower performance fee as the performance fee is more expensive
in bull markets. Financial literacy (measured by the advanced questions introduced by
van Rooij et al., 2011) and socio-demographics (age, gender, education, and income) are
elicited as further control variables.
Study II
In Study II, further design variations and the robustness of our results are investigated.
Instead of the within-subjects design of Study I, a between-subjects design is used.
Furthermore, the iterative elicitation of the maximum performance fee is replaced by a
more direct elicitation, the belief in a higher or lower performance of the performance
fee fund is measured directly, and a text question on signalling as an alternative reason
for performance fee funds is added. Participants are randomly assigned to one of three
groups:
• In the first group (Performance fee group), participants first decide on the maxi-
mum performance fee for a fund with a pure management fee fund as an alternative
(similar to case 1 in Study I). Afterwards they are asked text questions on the rea-
sons for their choice.
• In the second group (Text questions group) this order is reversed. Participants
first answer the text questions about possible reasons for buying one of the funds,
then they decide on the maximum performance fee.
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• In the third group (Management fee group), participants first decide on the max-
imum management fee they are willing to pay. Afterwards they answer the text
questions.
After an introduction screen, performance fees and management fees are defined.
While participants in Study I could deduce these definitions from the decision context,
they are necessary here to establish a level playing field for the different groups. The
performance fee is described as a fee that is paid as a percentage of the fund's gains and
that is only paid if the fund has positive returns. The management fee is described as a
fee that is paid as a percentage of the fund assets irrespective of the fund's performance.
After these definitions, both the performance fee group and the management fee group
see the same decision context. The text questions group sees this decision context after
answering the text questions (described later). The exact decision context is as follows.
Similar to the first decision in Study I, all participants of Study II are asked to invest an
hypothetical amount of e 10,000 in either a performance fee fund or in a management fee
fund. They are given the following information on the two funds. Both the management
fee fund and the performance fee fund invest in securities listed in the Euro Stoxx 50
and try to outperform the Euro Stoxx 50. Both are about to enter the market and
have no prior performance history. Again, subjects cannot rely on past performance of
the funds. Instead, they receive information about the Euro Stoxx 50 which can serve
as an indication for the funds' performance and for the funds' fees. Subjects are told
the average return of the Euro Stoxx 50 (6.9% p.a. since introduction), the historical
frequencies for positive and negative returns (65% and 35%), as well as the average
positive (22.4%) and negative return (-20.6%). These values differ slightly from the ones
in Study I as an additional return observation was available for Study II. Along with
this information, they are shown a histogram of the annual Euro Stoxx 50 returns since
introduction (similar to figure 2).
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After this description, all participants choose between the two funds. They have to
invest the whole investment amount in one fund; a split-up is not possible. Again, par-
ticipants do not receive a payment (cf. discussion on payments for Study I). Participants
in the performance fee group and in the text questions group decide on the maximum
performance fee they are ready to pay (as opposed to a 1.5% management fee). The
performance fee ranges from 2.5% to 30% in steps of 2.5 percentage points. Participants
in the management fee group decide on the maximum management fee they are ready to
pay (as opposed to a 17.5% performance fee). The management fee ranges from 0.5% to
3% in steps of 0.25 percentage points. While deciding, subjects still see the decision con-
text such that they can make an informed decision. Contrary to Study I, the maximum
performance or management fee is not elicited iteratively but subjects see all possible
choices at the same time. This avoids an anchor effect resulting from the starting point
of an iterative elicitation. At the same time, this design still allows for a choice situation
instead of a matching situation which is better suited in this context (cf. Lichtenstein
and Slovic, 1971; Carmon and Simonson, 1998). Subjects mark their choice for every
combination (e.g. 2.5% performance fee vs. 1.5% management fee; 5% performance fee
vs. 1.5% management fee etc.) and then submit all choices together by clicking on a
Go-on-button.
Participants then state their expected performance in percentage points for both funds
separately. This question replaces the text question on outperformance from Study I
and it allows for a quantification of an estimated outperformance of one of the two funds.
Participants in the performance fee group and the management fee group then answer
the text questions which have already been answered by participants in the text questions
group. The majority of questions from Study I has been used without changes. This
includes the questions on manager incentives, increased managerial risk taking, loss
aversion, and fairness. The text question on outperformance has been replaced by a
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direct elicitation and a question on signalling has been added. The new question on
signalling measures if a participant sees a performance fee as a signal of superior skills
of the fund or its advisers (cf. Das and Sundaram, 2002). Like all the text questions,
signalling is measured on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 meaning Strongly disagree and 7
meaning Strongly agree. The wording of the questions can be found in table 1. In Study
II, loss aversion and risk aversion are not elicited via lottery questions anymore. Given
their low explanatory power in Study I, the time-consuming lotteries were eliminated.
In all groups, participants then estimate the level of the Euro Stoxx 50 in one year
which is used as a measure for optimism (the Euro Stoxx was at around 2,500 points.
Financial literacy (measured by the advanced questions introduced by van Rooij et al.,
2011) and socio-demographics (age, gender, education, occupation, and income) are
elicited as further control variables.
Dataset
Subjects who participated more than once or who did not answer a minimum number
of questions were deleted from both studies. The dataset of Study I consists of the an-
swers of 325 subjects and the dataset of Study II consists of the answers of 260 subjects.
Personal characteristics of the participants are shown in table 2. In both studies, educa-
tion, income, and the high rate of male investors fit the average German investor much
better than the average German (cf. Destatis, 2010; Deutsches Aktieninstitut, 2010).
Subjects in the studies appear to be more educated and to earn more than the average
German. The average financial literacy is very high (9.1 out of 10 in Study I and 9.4
out of 10 in Study II); this should also fit the average investor better than the average
German. Perhaps, the average participant should be even better able to judge and to
succeed in financial decisions than the average investor. Altogether, the two datasets
should be well suited to learn about investors' decision making.
Insert table 2 here.
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Summary statistics for the dependent and the explanatory variables can be found in
table 3. The statistics are intuitively consistent and coherent. The average maximum
performance fee for the two-fund case is 17.4% and the average for the share-classes is
16.8% in Study I. In Study II, the maximum performance fees are lower (15.3% in the
Performance fee group and 12.5% in the Text questions group) which is probably due to
the different elicitation process. The means are significantly different from each other.
The means for the text questions are all around four which is the center point of their
one to seven scale. The mean loss aversion coefficient implies that our subjects are on
average loss averse and the mean risk aversion certainty equivalent implies that they are
also risk averse. Both of these values are in line with previous findings in the literature
(cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In both studies, the average participant estimated
the Euro Stoxx to move sideways; the mean estimated Euro Stoxx level in one year is
around the respective index level at the time of the study. Individual estimates vary
largely from zero points to 6,200.
Insert table 3 here.
3 Results
Subjects in both studies are asked to choose between two funds where the only difference
is the fee structure. They have to invest the full amount into one fund such that diversi-
fication is not an issue. In this scenario, an obvious potential driver of their choice could
be the intention to minimize fees. As the probability for positive and negative returns
as well as the conditional returns are given, the expected fees can be calculated. They
can be found in table 4. In Study I, the expected fee for the management fee fund is
constant at e 163 while the expected performance fee ranges from e 39 to e 470. The
10% performance fee has approximately the same expected value as the management
fee. Consequently, a fee minimizing investor should accept any performance fee up to
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10% and reject any performance fee that is higher. In Study II, the expected fees are
slightly different due to the fact that an additional annual return of the Euro Stoxx
50 was available. In the Performance fee group and in the Text questions group, the
expected fee for the management fee fund is constant at e 161 and the expected per-
formance fee ranges from e 36 to e 436. Again, a fee minimizing investor should accept
any performance fee up to 10% and reject any performance fee that is higher. In the
Management fee group in Study II, subjects choose between a fixed performance fee and
a changing management fee. In this group, the expected performance fee is constant at
e 255 while the expected management fee ranges from e 54 to e 349. A fee-minimizing
investor would accept any management fee up to 2.25% and reject any management fee
that is higher.
Insert table 4 here.
This is not what we find in the data (cf. table 3). The average maximum performance
fee is 17.4% (16.8% if we do not consider the two funds but the two share classes) in
Study I which is significantly different (1%-level). In Study II, the average performance
fee is also higher than 10%. In the Performance fee group the average maximum per-
formance fee is 15.3% (significant at 1%). With 12.5% in the Text questions group it
is still significantly above 10% but also significantly lower than in the Performance fee
group (both at the 1%-level). This implies that the preoccupation with reasons for and
against certain fees right before the actual choice affects this choice. In the Manage-
ment fee group, the average chosen management fee of 1.5% is significantly (1%-level)
lower than the fair management fee of 2.25% would be, again hinting at a preference
for performance fees. A reason for this choice may be the belief that funds with perfor-
mance fees perform better than those without. The right column of table 4 shows the
outperformance that would just compensate the investor for the difference in expected
fees; the outperformance would have to be even higher to make a net profit. In Study I
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for example, an investor accepting the 20% performance fee, would have to believe in an
outperformance of 1.8%. For the 30% fee, the outperformance would have to be 3.9%.
Note that this outperformance is not relative to the common benchmark but relative to
the management fee fund which also follows an active strategy. In the following, reasons
for this behavior will be analyzed in a multivariate setting separately for both Study I
and Study II.
Study I
Table 5 reports Tobit regressions with maximum performance fee for the two-fund
case as the dependent variable. All the Tobit models are estimated with upper and
lower bound to take the limited range of the maximum performance fee into account.
Column (1) of table 5 includes the basic explanatory variables. It appears that three
variables are the main drivers of the maximum performance fee: outperformance, man-
agerial risk-taking, and loss aversion. The general incentivization from a performance
fee does not appear to be a driver of the maximum performance fee. The belief in
an outperformance however, which should be the main effect of an incentivization, is
an economically (1.94 percentage points higher performance fee per point) and statisti-
cally (1%-level) significant driver. The fear for higher managerial risk-taking due to the
incentivization scheme is equally significant but it goes in the opposite direction (1.6
percentage points lower performance fee per point). This effect should be expected as
funds with performance fees are prone to increasing the fund risk (see e.g. Carpenter,
2000); subjects who are aware of this issue should incorporate it into their decision and
they should choose a lower performance fee. Loss aversion elicited in text form is also
a significant predictor; a higher loss aversion goes along with a 2.5 percentage points
higher performance fee. Fairness and negative fairness show no significant effect imply-
ing that investors rely mainly on economic reasons. Also, loss aversion and risk aversion
measured with standard lottery questions show no significant influence. This finding
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is not surprising as verbal measures are usually better suited to predict behavior than
those derived from lottery questions (Nosi¢ and Weber, 2010). Erner et al. (2012) have
shown that measured prospect theory parameters have hardly any predictive power for
the willingness to pay for financial products. Sautner et al. (2010) did not find any
significant relation between the valuation of financial assets and risk aversion measures.
The estimated Euro Stoxx level is statistically significant but the effect is economically
small: if the estimated level is 1,000 points higher, the maximum performance fee is
three percentage points lower.
Columns (2) to (6) of table 5 report the same regression with control variables added
one at a time. Column (7) shows the full regression including all control variables. Fi-
nancial literacy, education on college level, income over e 3,000, age, and male gender
are added. All of which have no significant influence on the maximum performance fee.
Coefficients of the explanatory variables are robust to the inclusion of these control vari-
ables. For some of the control variables like financial literacy or education, an influence
could have been expected. Khorana et al. (2009) hypothesize that more sophisticated
investors may seek lower fees as they may be more aware of fees. As described above,
our subjects have a very high financial literacy with a low variance. The low variance
could explain why no effect is found: the differences between the subjects are not large
enough.
Insert table 5 here.
Table 6 reports Tobit regressions with maximum performance fee for the two share
classes as the dependent variable. The share classes have an identical development before
fees: only the fee structure should matter in this case. As expected, outperformance and
managerial risk-taking are not significant anymore. The remaining variables have the
same effects as in the two-fund case. Loss aversion in text form remains statistically
and economically significant (a higher loss aversion goes along with a 2.7 percentage
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points higher performance fee). Fairness, negative fairness, loss aversion coefficients, and
risk aversion certainty equivalents again have no significant effects. The estimated Euro
Stoxx level is not significant. Column (2) to (6) of table 6 report the same regression with
control variables added one at a time. Column (7) shows the full regression including all
control variables. Financial literacy, college, income over e 3,000, age, and male gender
still have no significant influence on the maximum performance fee. Coefficients are
again robust to the inclusion of the control variables. Altogether, the analysis of the
share classes supports the previous results. The impact of loss aversion on the maximum
performance fee appears to result from a preference for certain monetary flows. Investors
prefer paying more in a good state if negative outcomes are reduced in a bad state. The
impact of outperformance and managerial risk-taking in the two-fund case appears to
result from incentivization effects which are not present with the share classes.
Insert table 6 here.
Different return distributions for the two share classes have also been tested in Study
I. The distribution and the conditional expected returns shown for the case of the share
classes were manipulated with a mean-preserving spread. The probability of a loss was
increased to 45%; negative returns were reduced in magnitude and the smallest positive
returns were reduced such that they became negative. The maximum performance fee
for this decision context was elicited after the share-class case. For this manipulation,
the average maximum performance fee rises to 18.2% (from 16.8% for the two standard
share classes). This makes perfect sense as the expected payable performance fee is
lower for the manipulation; the manipulation is cheaper. Results of Tobit regressions
are similar to the results for the two standard share classes. The effects described in the
share-class case persist.
Following classic portfolio theory, risk and return are meant to be considered simul-
taneously. For this reason a relation between the belief in a better performance and
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the belief in an increased risk might exist. To test for this possibility, interaction vari-
ables between better performance and increased risk have been created and added to
the models described above (not reported). The results reported above are robust to
the inclusion of these variables.
Study II
The three groups in Study II see different situations. The Performance fee group is
similar to the two-fund case in Study I. The Text question group has a different sequence
as compared to the Performance fee group as the text questions are asked before the
funds are presented. In the Management fee group, the management fee instead of the
performance fee is elicited. In all three groups the fees are elicited more directly than in
Study I.
Table 7 reports Tobit regressions with maximum performance fee for the Performance
fee group as the dependent variable. Column (1) includes the basic explanatory variables
which are slightly different from the ones used in Study I. outperformance is measured
directly instead of on a 1-7 Likert scale and signalling is added as a further explanatory
variable. The main explanatory variables from Study I are robust to the new elicitation
of the maximum performance fee: estimated outperformance, managerial risk-taking, and
loss aversion are significant predictors. The general incentivization from a performance
fee is still not a driver of the maximum performance fee. The belief in an outperformance
of the performance fee fund is statistically (1%-level) significant. Economic significance is
also given: for every percentage point of outperformance, a 2.7 percentage points higher
performance fee is accepted. As only a part of the outperformance goes to the fund via
the performance fee, this magnitude makes sense. The fear for higher mangerial risk-
taking is significant at the 1%-level and it confirms previous results with a 2.1 percentage
points lower performance fee per point. A higher loss aversion goes along with a two
percentage points higher performance fee (significant at the 5%-level). Fairness and
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negative fairness still show no significant effect. The estimated Euro Stoxx level is not
statistically significant in this sample. Signalling which was added in Study II has no
persistent effect.
Columns (2) to (6) of table 7 report the same regression with control variables added
one at a time. Column (7) shows the full regression including all control variables. Fi-
nancial literacy, education on college level, income over e 3,000, age, and male gender
are added. All of which have no persistent significant influence on the maximum per-
formance fee. Male gender is only significant at the 10%-level when it is included as
the only control variable. Coefficients of the explanatory variables are robust to the
inclusion of control variables. The analysis of the Performance fee group shows that the
previous results are persistent in a different sample and with a different elicitation of
the maximum performance fee. A direct measurement of the management fee and of
the estimated outperformance does not lead to different results. Signalling appears to
be unimportant for the choice of a fee scheme.
Insert table 7 here.
Table 8 reports Tobit regressions with maximum performance fee for the Text question
group as the dependent variable. Column (1) includes the basic explanatory variables
which are the same as in the other two groups of Study II. Except for managerial
risk-taking, the coefficients are very similar to those of the Performance fee group. Man-
agerial risk-taking has a higher effect: the maximum performance fee is reduced by 2.7
percentage points per point. It appears that thinking of possible reasons before taking
the decision makes subjects more aware of possible risks. Thinking before the decision
also leads to a behavior that is closer to the behavior of a fee-minimizing investor. This
notion is supported by the different constants in the Performance fee group and the Text
question group. The constant is much lower in the Text question group implying that a
lower performance fee is chosen on average. Fairness, negative fairness, and signalling
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are again insignificant. The estimated Euro-Stoxx level is statistically significant at the
10%-level but it is still economically insignificant. The coefficients of the explanatory
variables are robust to the inclusion of the control variables in columns (2) to (7). Think-
ing of reasons appears to lead to a decision that is closer to the fee-minimizing decision
and more aware of possible risks.
Insert table 8 here.
Table 9 reports Tobit regressions with maximum management fee for the Management
fee group as the dependent variable. Column (1) includes the basic explanatory variables.
This group allows to control for a different focus on the fee choice. Due to the elicitation
of the maximum management fee, the coefficients are not directly comparable to those
of the other groups. On the one hand, they have to have the opposite sign to support
the same hypothesis. On the other hand, their magnitude should be different due to
the dimension of the management fees: the management fee ranges from .5% to 3% in
steps of .25% while the performance fee in the other groups ranges from 2.5% to 30%
in steps of 2.5%. The estimated outperformance of the performance fee fund is again a
reason to prefer the performance fee fund, i.e. to choose a lower maximum management
fee. For every percentage point of outperformance, the accepted management fee is 0.32
percentage points lower. Loss aversion remains a significant reason for the performance
fee fund; a one point increase in loss aversion leads to a 0.28 percentage points lower
management fee. Negative fairness becomes significant too. The focus on management
fees leads to a different view on the management fees: investors fear to be treated
unfairly by paying too much when the fund performs badly (statistically significant at
the 1%-level; the chosen management fee is reduced by 0.19 percentage points per point).
Managerial risk-taking is not significant anymore. Apparently, the focus on a certain
fee leads to a focus on the risks of the respective fee. For a performance fee, the risk
is measured by managerial risk-taking. For management fees it is measured by negative
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fairness which is the risk to pay a fee even if the return is negative. The focus on
different fee types appears to lead to different perceived risks. In the discussion, this
will be considered in more detail. Estimated outperformance and loss aversion go in the
same direction as in the other groups. The coefficients of the explanatory variables are
also significant after the inclusion of the control variables in columns (2) to (7).
Insert table 9 here.
4 Discussion
We find that investors are ready to pay a premium for a performance fee fund. They
accept a higher expected fee if this fee is in form of a performance fee instead of a
management fee. In Study I for example, the average investor pays over e 100 more for
the performance fee scheme than for the management fee scheme. This amount is more
than 1% of the initial investment amount of e 10.000. At first glance, it appears that
average investors pay too much for performance fee funds and that the industry can
skim these additional fees to increase profits.
However it makes sense, that investors are ready to pay more if they believe in a better
performance. We show that this idea from the previous literature is indeed an important
argument for investors. While the literature has focussed on such incentive effects of
performance fees, we show that other factors exist as well. Loss aversion is such a factor:
Performance fees can also be beneficial because they allow to smooth returns after fees
by shifting fees to a period with positive returns. While incentive effects influence net
performance indirectly via the fund (management), smoothing influences net returns
directly as losses and gains are reduced in size. This smoothing is especially interesting
for loss averse investors. They can transfer a fee from a negative state (where it hurts
them more to pay it) to a positive state (where it hurts them less). This effect is very
persistent i.e it remains highly significant in all groups. The effect also persists if the
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performance fee and the outperformance are measured more directly in Study II. These
findings show that performance fees are not simply a tool to increase profits but that
they are also beneficial for investors.
The premium investors pay for a performance fee is reduced if investors are encouraged
to think about fee schemes before taking their decision. In the text question group of
Study II where this is the case, the average investor pays a premium of e 20 in expected
fees for the performance fee fund. The performance fee premium is reduced by around
80% and incentive effects and loss aversion can explain the remaining premium.
In both studies, it appears that investors focus on economic reasons when buying
funds. Non-economic arguments like fairness towards the fund (manager) were not found
to be significantly related to the decision. This is remarkable as fairness is frequently
put forth as an argument for performance fees in public discussions. It appears that the
fairness argument is merely a socially desirable rationalization.
Another interesting finding is the fact that investors focus on the specific risks of
the fee scheme that is elicited. When the management fee is elicited in the respective
group of Study II, investors focus on the main risk of a management fee: the risk to
pay a fee even if the return is negative (measured by negative fairness). The risk of
the performance fee, namely that the fund (management) increases the fund risk due to
its option-like participation in the returns (measured by managerial risk-taking), ceases
to be an important factor. When asked about different fees, investors focus on the
risk of the more prominently placed fee type. This finding is in line with the previous
literature. Vlaev et al. (2008) show for example that preferences depend on the attribute
that can be manipulated. Nevertheless, loss aversion and expected outperformance of
the performance fee fund are significant predictors in this group as well.
Our findings have implications for investors, regulators, and for the fund industry
itself. The industry should not only focus on incentive effects of performance fees like
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a possible outperformance but it should also point out that performance fees allow a
smoothing of net returns which is especially interesting for loss averse investors. In-
vestors for their part should take care that they pay not too high a premium for the
potential benefits of a performance fee. The fact that the premium is reduced by around
e 80 (or an economically important .8% of the investment amount) if investors are en-
couraged to think about pros and cons of fee schemes shows that fees are worth thinking
about. Regulators as mediators between the industry and the investor should keep both
sides in mind. Regulations that serve to clarify fee structures could improve investors'
understanding and thus be beneficial for the investor and the industry. Regulations that
aim at prohibiting performance fees however, may be detrimental to both sides as both
investors and the industry have potential benefits from performance fees. If incentive
effects are left aside, the industry on the one hand may earn a premium but the investor
on the other hand feels better due to a smoothing of his net returns. Consequently the
investor pays a premium for a service and the main concern should be that this premium
is not too high.
We consider mutual funds with asymmetric performance fees. However, our results
are also relevant for hedge funds and funds with symmetric performance fees. Most
hedge funds have an asymmetric performance fee that is similar to the fees we use. For
hedge funds too, loss averse investors could prefer paying an additional performance
fee for a good development over paying a higher management fee independently of the
fund's performance. Consequently, our results should be transferable to all funds with
asymmetric fees. This includes the majority of hedge funds and of European mutual
funds with performance fees. However, the majority2 of U.S. mutual funds which have
performance fees have symmetric performance fees, as only symmetric performance fees
are allowed for mutual funds. For these funds, the loss aversion effect should be even
2Elton et al. (2003) address the fact that the SEC has also tolerated mutual funds with asymmetric
performance fees for some time.
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more relevant as losses are even more attenuated. Managerial risk-taking however should
be less of an issue as the fund shares the risks. Future research should address symmetric
performance fees directly but altogether we expect our results to hold for these funds as
well.
Another approach for future research may be a more realistic fee scheme. We used a
simplified scheme to make it easy to understand the fees and easy to compute expected
values of the different schemes. In the future a pure management fee could be tested
against a combination of a smaller management fee and a performance fee. In this
setting, the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric performance fees is very
important. For asymmetric performance fees on the one hand, the loss aversion argument
only works if the performance fees are accompanied by lower fixed management fees. An
asymmetric performance fee on top of the normal management fee would ceteris paribus
lead to a lower average net return. For symmetric performance fees on the other hand,
the loss aversion argument could also work if the performance fee is charged on top of
a management fee as it reduces losses not only by avoiding a fee but also by a partial
refund of the losses. Another direction for future research could be the inclusion of the
expected fees into the description of the funds. It is possible that the premium investors
accept for a performance fee depends on the knowledge of the nominal Euro- or Dollar-
amount they pay in fees. This would be similar to a price-tag in a supermarket which
would make it easier to estimate how much better the performance fee fund would have
to perform in order to provide a net benefit. Such price-tags could help investors to avoid
paying too high a fee as discussed above. Furthermore, future research has to address
the fact that some performance fees are measured relative to a benchmark index.
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Figure 1: Design of Study I and Study II compared
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Figure 2: Histogram of the annual Euro Stoxx 50 returns since introduction
This histogram reports frequencies for annual Euro Stoxx 50 returns and was provided with the expla-
nations of the management fee fund and the performance fee fund. The same histogram with a different
title (Past annual returns of the fund) was provided for the choice between the two share classes.
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Table 1: Wording of text questions used
Explanatory variable Text question Included in
Study I Study II
Manager incentives The performance fee assures that the
fund manager acts in my interest.
Yes Yes
Outperformance A performance fee will have a positive
impact on the return of the fund.
Yes
Managerial risk-taking There could be the risk, that a fund
manager invests very riskily in order to
benefit from gains while he suffers less
from disadvantages in case of losses.
Yes Yes
Loss aversion I prefer paying a higher fee in case of
gains, if that allows me to avoid a fee in
case of losses.
Yes Yes
Fairness It is fair that a fund manager partici-
pates in the success of the investment.
Yes Yes
Negative fairness In case of losses, it is unfair to pay a fee. Yes Yes
Est. Euro Stoxx level Please estimate the development of the
Euro Stoxx over the next year. What is
the most likely level in your opinion?
Yes Yes
Signalling With the performance fee, the fund
manager gives me a clear signal that he
is better than other fund managers.
Yes
This table contains the wording of the questions that are used as explanatory variables. Responses are
measured on a 1-7 Likert scale where 7 indicates strong agreement with the respective statement. The
estimated Euro Stoxx level in one year was elicited as a point estimate. In Study II, the question on
signalling was added and outperformance was measured directly.
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Table 2: Participants' personal characteristics
(a) Education
Study I Study II Germany German investors
High school 39 (12.58%) 13 (5.44%) 65.80% 51.00%
Abitur 81 (26.13%) 44 (18.41%) 12.20% 47.00%
University degree 190 (61.29%) 182 (76.15%) 13.60% n.a.
Total 310 239
(b) Occupation
Study I Study II Germany German investors
University student 16 (4.97%) 6 (2.38%) 2.91% 2.51%
Employee 138 (42.86%) 150 (59.52%) 42.40% 58.23%
Self-employed 86 (26.71%) 35 (13.89%) 5.21% 11.43%
Unemployed 10 (3.11%) 6 (2.38%) 7.10% n.a.
Other 72 (22.36%) 55 (21.83%) 42.38% 27.83%
Total 322 252
(c) Monthly household income
Study I Study II Germany German investors
up to e 1,500 19 (9.45%) 9 (4.84%) 37.90% 2.58%
e 1,500 to e 3,000 35 (17.41%) 43 (23.12%) 32.57% 34.02%
e 3,000 to e 4,500 71 (35.32%) 58 (31.18%) 22.29% 29.94%
e 4,500 and more 76 (37.81%) 76 (40.86%) 7.24% 33.45%
Total 201 186
(d) Financial literacy, age, and gender
Study I Study II
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Financial literacy 9.120 1.270 0 10 9.381 0.904 6 10
Age 48.470 13.763 21 84 48.051 13.175 20 82
Male gender 0.886 0.921
Table 2(a) to 2(c) show the absolute number of participants with a certain education, occupation, and
income in both studies. Relative numbers are in brackets. Data in the row Germany is from Destatis
(2010) and data in German investors is from the DAI factbook (Deutsches Aktieninstitut, 2010).
Table 2(a) shows participants' education. German school types differ somewhat from international
school types. Abitur is comparable to high school diploma plus university entrance exam. Subjects are
highly educated compared to the German average. Table 2(b) illustrates the occupation of the subjects.
An above average number is self-employed. Table 2(c) illustrates the income of the subjects. Many
subjects are above the mean income group (German average according to Destatis (2010): e 3,141).
Table 2(d) shows financial literacy after van Rooij et al. (2011), age, and gender of the participants for
both studies. Financial literacy is above average and the sample mainly consists of men. Altogether,
deviations from the German average all go in one direction; the average participant should be better
able to judge and to succeed in financial decisions than the average German.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Study I Study II
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Maximum performance fee 17.38 15.3 12.5
(9.19) (9.13) (9.34)
Max. perf. fee (share classes) 16.77
(9.28)
Maximum management fee 1.492
(0.84)
Manager incentives 3.975 4.524 4.622 4.409
(2.00) (1.89) (1.66) (1.99)
Outperformance 3.623
(1.90)
Est. outperformance 0.661 0.22 0.46
(1.77) (0.95) (1.80)
Managerial risk-taking 3.761 4.317 4.767 3.955
(1.91) (1.68) (1.38) (1.89)
Loss aversion 4.279 4.463 4.678 4.205
(2.01) (1.98) (1.65) (2.02)
Loss aversion coeff. 3.646
(1.83)
Risk av. certainty equiv. 156.5
(99.31)
Fairness 4.101 4.524 4.911 4.455
(2.07) (1.82) (1.56) (1.97)
Negative fairness 3.914 4.512 4.4 4.034
(2.07) (2.03) (1.86) (2.18)
Est. Euro Stoxx level 2791.3 2579.4 2639.6 2548.4
(575.00) (375.70) (229.00) (340.10)
Signalling 3.817 3.656 3.057
(1.94) (1.99) (1.99)
This table reports the means (standard deviations are in brackets) for the maximum chosen performance
fees and the main explanatory variables for Study I as well as for the Performance fee group (group 1),
the Text questions group (group 2), and the Management fee group (group 3) of Study II. The mean
maximum performance fee for the two-fund case is above the minimum expected fee of 10%. Apparently,
subjects have other reasons to chose performance fees than a pure minimization of the expected fees.
The mean for the share classes is somewhat lower (the difference is statistically significant), which
makes sense as incentives of the fund manager should not play a role here. Nevertheless the mean is
still above 10% implying that there could be reasons other than incentives or fee minimization. The
same is true for and for the Text questions group implying that subjects who think about reasons first
choose differently. The explanatory variables from the text questions are all around four which is the
midpoint of the 1-7 scale (with 7 meaning Strong agreement). The loss aversion and risk aversion
measures imply that the average subject is loss averse and risk averse. The average subjects is neither
optimistic nor pessimistic about the future development of the Euro Stoxx 50.
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1.5% e 163.08 2.5% e 39.20 e 123.88 -1.3%
5.0% e 78.40 e 84.68 -0.9%
7.5% e 117.60 e 45.48 -0.5%
10.0% e 156.80 e 6.28 -0.1%
12.5% e 196.00 e -32.92 0.4%
15.0% e 235.20 e -72.12 0.8%
17.5% e 274.40 e -111.32 1.3%
20.0% e 313.60 e -150.52 1.8%
22.5% e 352.80 e -189.72 2.3%
25.0% e 392.00 e -228.92 2.8%
27.5% e 431.20 e -268.12 3.3%
30.0% e 470.40 e -307.32 3.9%









1.5% e 161.03 2.5% e 36.39 e 124.64 -1.2%
5.0% e 72.78 e 88.25 -0.9%
7.5% e 109.17 e 51.86 -0.5%
10.0% e 145.56 e 15.47 -0.2%
12.5% e 181.95 e -20.92 0.2%
15.0% e 218.34 e -57.31 0.6%
17.5% e 254.73 e -93.70 0.9%
20.0% e 291.12 e -130.09 1.3%
22.5% e 327.51 e -166.48 1.7%
25.0% e 363.90 e -202.87 2.0%
27.5% e 400.29 e -239.26 2.4%
30.0% e 436.68 e -275.65 2.8%
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Table 4: Expected fees (continued)









0.50% e 53.68 17.5% e 254.73 e -201.05 2.0%
0.75% e 80.51 e -174.21 1.7%
1.00% e 107.35 e -147.38 1.5%
1.25% e 134.19 e -120.54 1.2%
1.50% e 161.03 e -93.70 0.9%
1.75% e 187.87 e -66.86 0.7%
2.00% e 214.71 e -40.02 0.4%
2.25% e 241.54 e -13.18 0.1%
2.50% e 268.38 e 13.65 -0.1%
2.75% e 295.22 e 40.49 -0.4%
3.00% e 322.06 e 67.33 -0.7%
3.25% e 348.90 e 94.17 -0.9%
This table reports the expected fees an investor has to pay depending on the chosen fee structure. These
fees are calculated using the probability for positive and negative returns as well as the conditional
returns (which are also given to the subjects). Table 4(a) shows the expected fees for Study I, table
4(b) shows the expected fees for the Performance fee group and the Text questions group in Study II,
and table 4(c) shows the fees for the Management fee group in Study II. The 10% performance fee has
approximately the same expected value as the management fee. Consequently, a purely fee minimizing
investor should accept any performance fee up to 10% and reject any performance fee that is higher. In
the Management fee group, a fee minimizing investor should accept any management fee up to 2.25%.
The rightmost column shows the outperformance which the performance fee fund would need in order
to perform as good after fees as the management fee fund. For the investor to have a net benefit, the
outperformance would have to be even higher.
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Table 5: Tobit model for Study I explaining maximum performance fee (two-fund case)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Manager incentives -0.225 -0.227 -0.220 0.249 -0.324 -0.181 0.272
(0.556) (0.556) (0.567) (0.627) (0.560) (0.565) (0.649)
Outperformance 1.933∗∗∗ 1.945∗∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗ 2.031∗∗∗ 1.931∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗
(0.544) (0.546) (0.558) (0.621) (0.547) (0.558) (0.652)
Managerial risk-taking -1.624∗∗∗ -1.626∗∗∗ -1.519∗∗∗ -1.783∗∗∗ -1.572∗∗∗ -1.645∗∗∗ -1.650∗∗∗
(0.410) (0.410) (0.419) (0.484) (0.414) (0.417) (0.505)
Loss aversion 2.482∗∗∗ 2.485∗∗∗ 2.489∗∗∗ 2.166∗∗∗ 2.484∗∗∗ 2.474∗∗∗ 2.127∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.403) (0.415) (0.449) (0.406) (0.412) (0.465)
Loss aversion coeff. 0.139 0.150 0.117 0.223 0.102 0.184 0.176
(0.340) (0.342) (0.352) (0.377) (0.343) (0.351) (0.404)
Risk av. cert. equiv. 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Fairness 0.003 -0.015 0.012 0.155 0.005 -0.025 0.217
(0.466) (0.469) (0.480) (0.531) (0.471) (0.473) (0.555)
Negative fairness -0.144 -0.127 -0.164 -0.237 -0.235 -0.118 -0.349
(0.420) (0.424) (0.437) (0.470) (0.424) (0.431) (0.508)
Est. Euro Stoxx level -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)








Male gender 1.623 -1.043
(1.966) (2.266)
Constant 14.154∗∗∗ 12.986∗∗ 14.651∗∗∗ 17.863∗∗∗ 12.930∗∗∗ 12.246∗∗∗ 16.439∗∗
(3.851) (5.505) (4.038) (4.331) (4.424) (4.342) (7.288)
Observations 325 325 309 248 320 315 230
This table reports results for Tobit regressions on maximum performance fee for the two-fund case
of Study I. Besides outperformance and managerial risk-taking, loss aversion is the main explanatory
variable. Fairness appears to be irrelevant. The inclusion of control variables does not affect the results.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level, and ∗∗∗
at the 1%-level.
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Table 6: Tobit model for Study I explaining maximum performance fee (share classes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Manager incentives -0.977∗ -0.979∗ -0.986∗ -0.820 -1.066∗ -0.831 -0.760
(0.583) (0.583) (0.587) (0.686) (0.586) (0.587) (0.694)
Outperformance 0.846 0.855 0.764 0.533 0.888 0.660 0.362
(0.565) (0.566) (0.572) (0.675) (0.567) (0.575) (0.694)
Managerial risk-taking -0.825∗ -0.826∗ -0.769∗ -0.774 -0.811∗ -0.823∗ -0.674
(0.421) (0.421) (0.426) (0.517) (0.425) (0.425) (0.528)
Loss aversion 2.655∗∗∗ 2.658∗∗∗ 2.648∗∗∗ 2.160∗∗∗ 2.643∗∗∗ 2.660∗∗∗ 2.216∗∗∗
(0.422) (0.422) (0.429) (0.491) (0.424) (0.428) (0.498)
Loss aversion coeff. 0.186 0.194 0.158 -0.036 0.186 0.163 -0.125
(0.355) (0.357) (0.363) (0.411) (0.358) (0.364) (0.431)
Risk av. cert. equiv. -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Fairness 0.139 0.126 0.143 0.241 0.193 0.161 0.259
(0.489) (0.493) (0.497) (0.582) (0.494) (0.493) (0.595)
Negative fairness -0.051 -0.038 0.028 0.057 -0.139 -0.023 0.065
(0.436) (0.440) (0.447) (0.511) (0.440) (0.444) (0.539)
Est. Euro Stoxx level -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)








Male gender 0.282 -2.355
(2.035) (2.426)
Constant 14.388∗∗∗ 13.485∗∗ 15.040∗∗∗ 19.428∗∗∗ 14.263∗∗∗ 14.146∗∗∗ 15.916∗∗
(4.007) (5.773) (4.151) (4.689) (4.588) (4.482) (7.731)
Observations 325 325 309 248 320 315 230
This table reports Tobit regressions on maximum performance fee for the two share classes. As expected
due to the irrelevance of the fee choice for the incentives of the fund (manager), outperformance and
managerial risk-taking are not significant anymore. Loss aversion however remains a main explanatory
variable. Fairness remains irrelevant. The inclusion of control variables does not affect the results.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level, and ∗∗∗
at the 1%-level.
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Table 7: Tobit model for Study II (Performance fee group)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Manager incentives -0.963 -1.000 -1.329 -0.656 -0.930 -0.742 -0.842
(1.400) (1.421) (1.437) (1.421) (1.396) (1.383) (1.466)
Est. outperformance 2.719∗∗∗ 2.729∗∗∗ 2.820∗∗∗ 2.651∗∗∗ 2.763∗∗∗ 2.646∗∗∗ 2.783∗∗∗
(0.788) (0.793) (0.804) (0.789) (0.787) (0.828) (0.852)
Managerial risk-taking -2.072∗∗∗ -2.079∗∗∗ -1.947∗∗ -2.232∗∗∗ -2.184∗∗∗ -2.097∗∗∗ -2.290∗∗∗
(0.748) (0.749) (0.752) (0.760) (0.768) (0.738) (0.777)
Loss aversion 1.979∗∗ 1.979∗∗ 1.868∗∗ 1.886∗∗ 1.888∗∗ 2.181∗∗ 1.889∗∗
(0.888) (0.888) (0.889) (0.887) (0.896) (0.885) (0.899)
Fairness 2.222 2.257 2.651 2.010 2.234 2.128 2.416
(1.655) (1.671) (1.701) (1.658) (1.649) (1.629) (1.705)
Negative fairness -0.025 -0.001 0.070 -0.082 0.134 -0.218 0.076
(0.755) (0.771) (0.757) (0.754) (0.796) (0.753) (0.824)
Est. Euro Stoxx level -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Signalling -1.661 -1.665 -1.766 -1.591 -1.731 -1.808∗ -1.913∗
(1.063) (1.063) (1.062) (1.059) (1.066) (1.052) (1.055)








Male gender -6.873∗ -6.333
(4.087) (4.090)
Constant 19.324∗∗ 17.664 18.706∗∗ 21.181∗∗ 21.668∗∗ 25.928∗∗∗ 24.480∗
(8.514) (13.872) (8.483) (8.648) (9.294) (9.259) (14.145)
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 81 81
This table reports Tobit regressions on maximum performance fee for the Performance fee group of
Study II. The results support the findings from the two-fund case of Study I. Estimated outperformance,
managerial risk-taking and loss aversion are found to be significant predictors. ∗ indicates significance
at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level, and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Table 8: Tobit model for Study II (Text questions group)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Manager incentives -0.956 -0.821 -0.868 -1.012 -1.169 -1.021 -1.245
(0.808) (0.812) (0.804) (0.826) (0.830) (0.853) (0.877)
Est. outperformance 2.723∗∗∗ 2.672∗∗∗ 2.849∗∗∗ 2.732∗∗∗ 2.877∗∗∗ 2.927∗∗∗ 3.007∗∗∗
(0.678) (0.675) (0.684) (0.680) (0.747) (0.763) (0.777)
Managerial risk-taking -2.720∗∗∗ -2.751∗∗∗ -2.734∗∗∗ -2.774∗∗∗ -2.557∗∗∗ -2.675∗∗∗ -2.852∗∗∗
(0.803) (0.797) (0.800) (0.821) (0.843) (0.884) (0.895)
Loss aversion 2.106∗∗∗ 1.962∗∗∗ 2.143∗∗∗ 2.044∗∗∗ 1.914∗∗∗ 2.090∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗
(0.673) (0.684) (0.674) (0.699) (0.694) (0.717) (0.750)
Fairness -0.413 -0.321 -0.693 -0.337 -0.128 -0.452 -0.042
(0.902) (0.901) (0.929) (0.932) (0.943) (0.955) (1.012)
Negative fairness -0.554 -0.497 -0.546 -0.590 -0.668 -0.579 -0.696
(0.559) (0.559) (0.556) (0.570) (0.571) (0.590) (0.601)
Est. Euro Stoxx level 0.006∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Signalling 0.087 0.216 0.198 0.107 0.115 0.229 0.331
(0.753) (0.761) (0.752) (0.755) (0.772) (0.806) (0.805)








Male gender -1.537 -1.029
(4.456) (4.633)
Constant 8.552 -4.973 6.212 9.482 0.042 8.746 -9.606
(10.012) (16.468) (10.117) (10.417) (11.396) (11.425) (18.498)
Observations 88 88 88 88 85 83 83
This table reports Tobit regressions on maximum performance fee for the Text questions group of Study
II. The results support the findings from the two-fund case of Study I. Estimated outperformance,
managerial risk-taking and loss aversion are found to be significant predictors. However, asking for
reasons first leads to a lower average level of the chosen performance fee which is reflected in the much
lower constant in this group as compared to the Performance fee group. ∗ indicates significance at the
10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level, and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Table 9: Tobit model for Study II (Management fee group)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Manager incentives 0.209∗ 0.208∗ 0.207∗ 0.193∗ 0.212∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.183
(0.108) (0.110) (0.108) (0.108) (0.112) (0.108) (0.112)
Est. outperformance -0.326∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗ -0.264∗∗
(0.116) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113)
Managerial risk-taking 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.090 0.100 0.098 0.100
(0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.077) (0.078)
Loss aversion -0.286∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.195∗ -0.205∗
(0.098) (0.100) (0.098) (0.098) (0.100) (0.107) (0.115)
Fairness -0.050 -0.049 -0.052 -0.028 -0.077 -0.108 -0.083
(0.110) (0.113) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.110) (0.114)
Negative fairness -0.188∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.071)
Est. Euro Stoxx level 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Signalling 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.044 0.048 0.012 0.038
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.063) (0.058) (0.063)








Male gender -0.193 -0.136
(0.352) (0.365)
Constant -1.437 -1.739 -1.429 -1.407 -1.206 -1.431 -1.963
(1.336) (1.688) (1.335) (1.328) (1.487) (1.375) (1.860)
Observations 90 89 90 90 85 86 84
This table reports Tobit regressions on maximum management fee for the Management fee group of
Study II. Note that coefficients have to go in the opposite direction than in the previous tables in
order to have the same implications as before. This is due to the fact that the management fee is
the dependent variable now. As before, estimated outperformance and loss aversion are found to be
significant predictors. With a focus on fixed fees, the fear of managerial risk-taking is not seen anymore.
Fairness however becomes a more important issue. ∗ indicates significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the
5%-level, and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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